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Abstract
Many countries around the world now face the dual challenges of closing the remaining gaps in access to drink-
ing water in rural areas while further addressing the issues of equity, quality, and sustainability outlined in the new
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Our research explores the key factors for sustainability in rural drinking
water services in Chile, an important example not only due to its success in rural water access but also because of
the new directions the country is taking to achieve the SDGs. Drawing on results from a Delphi study of Chilean
rural water experts, we discuss the most important issues identified, including water availability and investment
in community water organizations, as well as disagreement among experts, particularly around roles of private
service providers and the national government. We leverage these results to assess Law No. 20.998 passed in
2017, which aims to address problematic variation in rural water services by introducing a stronger role for central
government and conferring more responsibility on rural water organizations. The work presents insights for
challenges countries closer to universal coverage will face as they work towards the SDGs and provides an
analysis of the new rural drinking water governance landscape in Chile.
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1. Introduction
Research on functionality and sustainability of rural water systems often focuses on countries with
lower rates of coverage. Yet, countries with nearly universal access in rural areas still face issues
with intermittent services, adequate tariff collection, equity, and sustainable practices to maintain the
water supply. Chile is one such case that is further on the continuum of service provision. The case
merits attention given the country’s salient debate on the role of state and private actors in drinking
water services as well as the passage of a sweeping policy change around rural water governance
passed in 2017. The impetus for the new law is to address the lingering variability in the quality of
rural water service. These changes in the governance landscape in Chile have direct implications for
improving equity, quality, and sustainable infrastructure, with indirect implications for addressing the
sustainability of water resources in the future.
The new law in Chile stands in contrast to many other Latin American countries that have moved
toward decentralization by elevating the role of local government. Instead, Chile’s law weakens the
role of private actors and builds the responsibilities and regulatory capacity of the central government.
With a 3-year window to implement the law, there is pressure on the government to transition the
landscape of rural water services to defend the viability of the law’s approach, especially given the
contention among some that the best approach would be to further rely on private stakeholders in
rural areas to shore up and support community-managed systems. This article shines a light on the
changes in progress during this tenuous window in Chile, comparing opinions of water sector experts
with the directions of the new law.
We draw our insights from a Delphi analysis conducted in 2016, prior to the passage of the new law
asking Chilean rural water sector experts to identify factors that influence the sustainability of rural
water service delivery in Chile. The study allows us to uncover areas of consensus and areas of division
and debate. We use the analysis of the results to discuss the implications and challenges of the new law
as implementers strive to reform the governance structure of rural water services in Chile. Our findings
suggest disparate ideas about the role of water availability and climate change and the direction the
country should pursue in terms of which actors should take lead roles in addressing deficiencies of
rural water systems. It also draws attention to the challenges of policy implementation associated
with rolling out a sweeping policy change to address problems in rural water systems.
2. Progress and challenges ahead in rural water services
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) helped to coordinate actors across the world to reduce
by half, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of the population without access to safe drinking water.
Specifically, in rural areas, the proportion of the population with access to improved drinking water
sources climbed from 62% to 84% (WHO & UNICEF, 2015). Despite the inclusion of the words ‘sus-
tainable’ and ‘safe’ in the MDG water target, actors focused primarily on access, leading many efforts to
be principally focused on the construction of new infrastructure. Meanwhile, scholars and practitioners
continued to draw attention to the issues of equity, water quality, sustainability, and functionality –
issues that plagued rural water systems well before the articulation of the MDGs (Herrera, 2019).
The 2015–2030 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) expand the charge for governments to not
only reach unserved populations but also improve service levels and sustain existing infrastructure. This
emphasis on service continuity and quality is justified by the experience in rural Latin America where,
by 2015, 84% of people living in rural areas had access to improved drinking water but experienced
irregular supply, breakdown, and variable water quality (WHO & UNICEF, 2015). Triana Soto (2013)
estimates that 60% of rural populations in Latin America receive an irregular supply of water, which reaches
95% in some countries. Indeed, during the MDG era, evidence shows a marked regression in service func-
tionality and reliability of existing infrastructure due to a multitude of complex environmental, institutional,
economic, technical, and political externalities (Walters & Javernick-Will, 2015; Walters et al., 2017).
The focus on sustainability and quality places the communities who rely upon and manage rural water
systems at the heart of the discussion. Reforms, implemented in many countries throughout the 1990s,
shifted governance approaches away from a state-led centralized service structure to place communities
in charge, making local ownership and responsibility the most prevalent management approach across
the world (Chowns, 2015; Hutchings et al., 2015). The underlying tenet of this management strategy,
known in the international water sector as community-based management (CBM), operates under the
assumption that communities have the capacity to organize and carry out the operation, administration,
and maintenance of water systems once they are built. Yet, the delegation of primary responsibility to
local communities with limited human and financial resources to adequately maintain water systems has
led to failure, and a call to expand the analysis of how to achieve sustainable rural water systems to
a wider governance structure that includes the entities and structures which support communities
(Vásquez, 2013; Nelson-Nuñez & Pizzi, 2018), particularly with respect to post-construction support
(Whittington et al., 2009).
There are various angles through which scholars categorize and assess the wider governance struc-
tures supporting water systems. Some debates focus on private versus public management (Bakker,
2010) and others on the benefits of decentralized governance (Wilder & Romero Lankao, 2006; Herrera
& Post, 2014), or the fragmentation of water governance across ministries and government levels
(Akhmouch, 2012). Meinzen-Dick (2007) argues that there are no panaceas in water institutions and
critics of the search for optimal institutional arrangements point out that the iteration of policies is
more likely to improve outcomes than whole-sale renovation or adoption of new institutional structures
(Pritchett & Woolcock, 2004). Yet, few have followed such iterative policy change to assess the degree
to which shifting institutional structures address the existing weaknesses of CBM. Moreover, contexts of
poor coverage of rural water services have garnered more attention among scholars than those further
along in the continuum of service provision with high coverage and relatively robust or functional gov-
ernance structures but still challenged in achieving sustainability and quality for rural water services.
2.1. Case of Chile
Chile is further in the continuum of service provision than most Latin American countries. In 1964,
only an estimated 6% of Chilean rural inhabitants had drinking water access (Donoso, 2018). At present,
53% of the rural population has access to rural water systems, totalling over 1,900,000 beneficiaries,
88% of which are located in concentrated or semi-concentrated rural towns (Donoso et al., 2015;
Fuster et al., 2016; Donoso, 2018). Like many countries, Chile struggles with access among dispersed
rural populations, but the Joint Monitoring Programme reports that Chile has reached 100% coverage of
basic drinking water services for communities with more than 15 houses per linear kilometre of
distribution line, compared to 85% across Latin America (WHO & UNICEF, 2015). More localized
Chilean sources, however, show that these figures decrease to between 50% and 70% coverage when
considering more dispersed rural communities (Hearnea & Donoso, 2005; Donoso, 2018).
The foundation of this success was laid in 1964 when Chile implemented the Rural Potable Water
programme (APR) with help from the Inter-American Development Bank. To date, 1,736 APR systems
exist throughout the country, each with the mandate of providing drinking water to rural communities
that meets standards for quality, quantity, and continuity in accordance with the Chilean Drinking Water
Standard No. 409 (SISS, 2006). Another 234 APR facility are to be installed in semi-concentrated
locations in the coming year. As more water systems are installed, the institutional burden of
maintenance increases, presenting challenges for resource allocation and strategies for management
(Donoso, 2018).
Chile is known as a paradigmatic case of privatized approaches to drinking water and water resource
management (Bauer, 1997; Baer, 2014). The primary water code was established in 1981 under the
Pinochet dictatorship. It implemented private water rights that can be traded with minimal restrictions
and limited state regulation. Most research on Chile’s water challenges and successes is focused on
the effect of water rights on agricultural actors and the privatized urban utilities (Bauer, 1997; Hearnea
& Donoso, 2005). While many scholars have documented issues in rural drinking water around water
rights, the challenges of the functionality and sustainability of rural water systems have garnered
less attention.
Chile relies heavily on the CBM approach with support from the central government and local
private actors. Community water organizations (CWOs) – comprised of water committees and water
cooperatives – have responsibility for water system operation and maintenance. The Department of
Water Works (DOH) and the Ministry of Public Works (MOP) supervise the operation and management
and water quality assessment by CWOs through the use of regional water supply operators called ‘tech-
nical units’, with visits from these specialists every 6 months (Donoso, 2018). Initial capacity building
efforts for new CWOs are provided by the Sub-Directorate for Rural Potable Water (SAPR), focusing on
helping communities propose new projects, budget existing ones, and monitor and evaluate their
services. Follow-up involvement from SAPR exists to support minimal water quality standards.
There is variation in the level of service and functionality of APRs. Most rural water systems
‘reported at least one unscheduled water outage in the past 6 months’ (Fuster et al., 2016). The
monitoring of drinking water quality also varies with 1 in 10 failing to conduct bacteriological tests
over a 5-year period (Donoso et al., 2015). While larger water systems are more likely to collect tariffs
large enough to maintain operations, smaller systems struggle to afford maintenance and upgrades.
Moreover, water supply is increasingly a concern. In 2015, 6% of rural water systems were supplied
by water trucks (Donoso, 2018). Overall, an estimated 200,000 people living in rural areas likely receive
an insufficient amount of water as per OMS standards (Donoso, 2018).
To address these challenges, the government passed the most sweeping changes to rural drinking
water governance since the 1981 Water Code. The Regulation of Rural Water and Sanitation Services
Law No. 20.998 was passed in 2017. The new law was collaboratively developed by the MOP through
the DOH with the collaboration of other ministries and leaders of APRs. It is intended to help commit-
tees and cooperatives regulate programmatic aspects related to APR service implementation, technical
support, regulation and norms, tariff collection, and maintenance, both for drinking water and for the
collection and treatment of wastewater. The new regulation aims to strengthen the management capacity
of community organizations, address deficits in tariffs through implementing a tariff structure covering
service operation, establish stronger rights and obligations for CWOs and operators, and strengthen the
ability of the central government to enforce norms. Figure 1 depicts the governance structure before and
after the new law.
The implementation of a new water governance structure presents many challenges. With the new
law, DOH and SAPR are faced with the task of developing guidelines for the selection, financing,
and implementation of new projects, and for the management of existing services for drinking water
supply systems in rural Chile. As our discussion below explores, the increasing responsibility of
CWOs to comply with new standards as overseen by the SAPR will require significant training and
coordination. Given many voices would prefer a policy that reduces government regulation and
increases the role of private stakeholders, the window of implementation is a critical juncture.
Among the most pressing challenges are endemic externalities that may confound the success of the
new APR regulation framework, including (1) an aging APR system infrastructure, where the average
system age is 23 years old (Donoso et al., 2015); (2) water committees or cooperatives lack the skills to
operate and maintain their system; (3) the potential for cultural opposition to increased water user fees;
(4) administrative challenges with shifting from water service provision to full ‘in-house’ provision of
training and technical services to water committees by the MOP, and (5) policy resistance from
opposing stakeholders. Given these issues that can influence APR programme success in the future,
our study presents a timely analysis of the governance challenges and conflicts at hand.
3. Method
We employ a Delphi approach with a panel of Chilean rural water sector experts to identify consensus
on the importance of drivers that influence rural water service delivery in Chile. The Delphi Method is a
research technique used to facilitate consensus within an expert group regarding underlying relation-
ships among causal drivers (Linstone & Turoff, 1975). It has been used as a policy sector analysis
approach for a wide array of sectors including water (Mayor et al., 2016; de Carvalho et al., 2017).
The consensus is pursued through a multi-round survey whereby, in each subsequent round, panelists
are presented with the aggregate group responses from the previous round to allow reconsideration of
choices in light of the other participant responses and provide opportunities for experts to clarify
their reasoning for either staying with or changing their response. The approach follows an iterative
process: (1) the identification and selection of experts; (2) the design of remote questionnaire; (3) the
participation of experts within survey rounds; (4) the evaluation of consensus for each ground;
(5) the communication of results back to experts; and (6) the generation of consensus or non-consensus
results (Hallowell & Gambatese, 2010). The process offers a structured and systematic means to arrive at
a consensus on a complex topic.
Fig. 1. Law No. 20.998 organizational APR restructuring. The previous privatized structure slated for removal is shown in grey.
We base consensus on a set of non-parametric measures, absolute deviation, range, and interquartile
range (IQR) to improve the granularity of results. Here, the consensus of a factor was met if it had an
absolute deviation of less than 0.5, an IQR of less than 1.0, and a range less than 3. Drivers that did not
meet these criteria became non-consensus factors. Next, factors are prioritized by summing the factor
score across experts.
3.1. Expert panel selection
As per the suggestion of Hallowell & Gambatese (2010), we used set criteria to minimize bias on
expert characteristics. We required three points for inclusion based on the following criteria:
• Author of scholarly articles on rural water service in Chile (one point per article, maximum 3), or sustain-
able rural water service planning, implementation, and management (one point per article, maximum 2)
• Author of non-scholarly articles on rural water service in Chile (one point per article, maximum 2) or
sustainable rural water service planning, implementation, and management (one point)
• Member or chair of a nationally recognized committee focused on rural water service planning,
implementation, and management in Chile (one point)
• Five years of professional experience with rural water service in Chile (three points)
• Graduate degree in engineering, sociology, and/or economics (two points)
• Conference presentation on rural water service in Chile (one point)
Using these criteria, we identified 23 experts, 14 of whom agreed to participate in the study. The par-
ticipants included four academics, one lawyer in rural water rights, two water consultants in private
water service, one water committee member, and five government officials working on rural water ser-
vice development and regional planning.
3.2. Delphi process
We elicited expert opinion on drivers and their importance in four survey rounds. Round 1 required
expert to list and define the drivers that influence the sustainability of rural water services in Chile. To
ensure experts also considered the common drivers from the literature, we included a generalized list of
eight common drivers identified by Walters & Javernick-Will (2015): Management, Finances, Govern-
ment, External Support, Technology, Construction & Materials, Environment & Energy, and Water
System Functionality. Round 2 required experts to rate factor importance on a Likert scale of 1 (not
important) to 5 (very important). We then generated a rating score per item and presented all consensus
and non-consensus factors along with median scores to experts for Round 3, asking them to reconsider
their responses given the group’s ranking results in an attempt to reach consensus. After repeating the
process for Round 4, we deemed drivers that did not reach consensus as non-consensus drivers and
summed and ranked consensus drivers for each expert.
4. Results
Round 1 yielded 34 unique drivers identified by the experts, including the eight common drivers we
included. Table 1 presents the ranking for each factor based on the sum number of points each issue
received by all participants. We report three measures of consensus, including the absolute deviation
measure capturing how much responses deviate between experts, the IQR evaluating the range of dispersion
between ratings, and the delta, which is the maximum score difference between participants. The latter
measure is the most difficult test of consensus, and we find only three issues scored above the threshold
of two to indicate a lack of consensus. The final column of Consensus Round indicates the first round
when the consensus of all participants using the same score of importance for a measure was reached.
5. Discussion
In this section, we highlight factors with the most importance, factors without consensus, and themes
that emerge. We also relate our results to the new law that will reshape many aspects of rural water
governance.
Table 1. Drivers that influence sustainability of rural water systems.
Rank Factor Sum Med. Abs. IQR Δ Consensus round
1 Availability of water resources 67 5 0.214 0 1 2
2 CWO: management 65 5 0.357 1 2 2
3 Water service providers 64 5 0.429 1 1 2
4 Capacity of operators 63 5 0.357 1 1 4
5 CWO: finances 63 5 0.5 1 2 2
6 CWO: education 61 4.5 0.5 1 1 3
7 Support network 60 5 0.357 1 1 4
8 Adequate tariffs 60 4 0.286 1 1 2
9 Adequate maintenance 60 4 0.429 1 2 2
10 Regulatory/legal framework 59 5 0.429 1 1 4
11 Future water demand 59 5 0.5 1 2 4
12 Water system functionality 59 4 0.357 1 2 4
13 Source management and water rights 59 4 0.5 1 2 2
14 Studies of source 58 4 0.5 1 2 4
15 Quality of construction practices 58 4 0.286 0 2 3
16 Financial audits 57 4 0.357 0 2 2
17 Availability of materials 57 4 0.5 1 2 2
18 Source contamination 57 4 0.357 0 2 3
19 National government support 56 4 0.214 0 2 4
20 Community participation 56 4 0.286 0 2 3
21 Appropriate technology 55 4 0.357 1 1 4
22 Number of household connections 55 4 0.429 0 2 4
23 Continuity of CWO leaders 55 4 0.5 0 2 3
24 Users: training and education 55 4 0.357 0 2 3
25 Electrical infrastructure 51 4 0.5 1 2 4
26 Climate change 51 4 0.5 1 2 3
27 Behaviour of users 48 3 0.429 1 2 3
28 NGO support 47 4 0.5 1 2 4
29 Capacity of the municipal government 46 3 0.429 1 2 2
30 CWO: training 46 3 0.429 1 2 3
31 Agricultural water use 40 3 0.214 0 2 4
5.1. Water resources
We bundle a few of the factors identified by experts together relating to water resources: water avail-
ability (ranked 1), future water demand (ranked 11), source management and water rights (ranked 13),
studies on water sources (14), source contamination (18), climate change (26), and agricultural water use
(31 – last). The fact that one aspect scores the highest, one the lowest, and the others spread throughout
points to the multidimensionality of water resource issues in Chile and perhaps to the disagreement
around their gravity and how best to address them.
The availability of water resources ranked first in our findings, reaching consensus in the second
round. The availability and allocation of water resources in Chile are regulated by the Water Code
from 1981, with a modification in 2005 that added new regulation and restrictions but limited these
to apply only to new water rights, which constituted a small minority of water rights (Bauer, 2015).
Under Article 73 Letter N of the new law, the SAPR can buy water rights to ensure water supply to
communities. Yet, whether to legally prioritize human consumption in water rights is an area of
fierce debate and has been a political football across presidential administrations. The first Bachelet
administration proposed constitutional reform of water rights, which was withdrawn at the start of
the more fiscally conservative Piñera administration in 2010. In 2016, the second Bachelet government
sought to address this issue introducing Bulletin 7543-12 to amplify the right of human consumption
and limit perpetual private water rights. The change has been contested this year, however, when the
returning Piñera administration introduced a revision guaranteeing perpetual rights.
Future water demand, ranked 11, is related to this concern but is also related to issues communities
face with the timely expansion of connections to reach new households in growing communities. The
expansion issue is partially addressed through the new law, which requires CWOs to include expansion
plans in their planning and financial reporting. The new law also helps alleviate problems CWOs faced
in the past by accessing money for expansion by giving more power to cooperatives to access subsidies
for projects of expansion.
Interestingly, climate change was ranked low by our study participants. This discrepancy in our
results about the importance of the possible impact of climate change versus the importance of water
availability is intriguing and consistent with other studies such as that by Connolly et al. (2018)
which finds that water experts in Africa ranked concerns over climate change lower than increasing
demand for limited supplies. Part of the perceived distinction among our experts may be related to infor-
mation. To this point, studies of source, specifically ‘the need to invest resources in hydraulic and
hydrogeological studies to identify sources of supply that give sustainability to projects, including con-
sidering drought scenarios and predictions’, ranked at 14. On the one hand, there is attention to this
issue, as every year, each region has invested in initiatives to identify new sources. For example, in
2018, $1,235,611 million pesos were invested in such studies, and another $1,744,469 million pesos
have been committed for 2019. On the other, water users in Chile operate in a context lacking mean-
ingful monitoring of groundwater supply or adequate supervision and data collection of ground water
withdrawal (Bauer, 2015), which is a prerequisite for the sustainable management of aquifers. This
information gap could, at least partially, explain why the relevance of climate change to water avail-
ability is not equally pressing in the minds of our experts.
Another possibility is that experts’ views are shaped by the context in which they have worked.
Drought and climate change have impacted some regions more intensely than others. For example,
Coquimbo, Valparaiso, El Maule, and Metropolitan Regions total 86% declarations of water shortage
from 2011 to 2014 (Bustos et al., 2015). Yet, in these areas, extensive scholarship establishes that the
gravity of crises is not simply a function of the drought but also the ability of institutions to adapt and
respond to crises (Clarvis & Allan, 2014). Indeed, one expert explained, ‘climate change is not yet a
determining factor, but rather how water is used in the basin’, implying that the issue is not a lack of
water, rather how it is used. Another argued ‘the concept of “climate change” has been known for a
long time, so it is the duty of the users to be able to efficiently manage the resource’.
Agricultural water use ranked last, despite high-profile conflicts such as in the region of Petorca where
accusations that avocado plantations have dried up sources for drinking water systems made international
news.1 One expert in our study pointed out that ‘conflicts of the APR with the organizations of irrigators
are frequent and relevant’, while another defended the low importance. The expert argued that the problem
is not ‘the over exploitation of water in agriculture, which I do not observe’. Again, the discrepancy
between the high ranking of water availability and the lowest ranking of agricultural water use could
lie in the lack of adequate data around agricultural water withdrawals and the health of aquifers.
5.2. The roles of community water organizations
The second highest factor in our results is CWO management, specifically the strength and capacity
of the CWOs to manage the operation and maintenance of water systems. The sustainability of rural
water systems, both in Chile and in most developing countries, as discussed above in relation to
CBM, rests most heavily on the shoulders of the CWOs. Yet, there is disagreement in our results
about the roles of CWOs. On the one hand, CWO management and the education levels of the members
of CWOs (ranked 6) place in the top 10 factors, indicating a consensus around the critical importance of
CWOs to have the capacity to carry out administrative and management roles. On the other hand,
training of the CWOs, which is ranked low at 30, and the technical capacity of CWOs, which does
not even reach consensus, indicate mixed opinions on how to fortify the rural water system sustainability
and what roles CWOs ought to play. This debate surfacing in our results is now more salient in Chile
given the new law, which elevates the importance and responsibility of CWOs, rather than lessening
their burden through prioritizing local government or private actors, such as the technical units.
Some scholars point to the weaknesses of CWOs as evidence their responsibilities should be limited
and instead delegated to outside entities, such as private contractors. These weaknesses are more likely
for CWOs that serve a smaller number of households or connections. Systems with fewer household
connections have smaller economies of scale, translating to a higher cost per connection. Fuster et al.
(2016) found that the biggest hurdles in complying with the new law will be faced by committees
managing smaller water systems, but that the law presents compliance challenges even for the larger
water cooperatives. One expert who rated the technical capacity of the CWO low in importance
argued that the actual technical capacity of many CWOs had been limited for years as most committees
do not even have professional knowledge about sanitation nor access to studies. That expert attributes
the successes in services to other factors, suggesting that it is more important to invest in operators and
private technical units.
1 See, for example: ‘Chilean Villagers Claim British Appetite for Avocado is Draining Region Dry’ in The Guardian, May 17,
2018. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/may/17/chilean-villagers-claim-british-appetite-for-avocados-is-draining-
region-dry.
Instead, the new law expands the responsibilities of CWOs and enhances the central government’s
ability to strengthen and regulate CWOs to ensure compliance and address variation in performance.
The new law will require CWOs to obtain licences valid for 5 years. In order to acquire a licence,
CWOs must demonstrate the possession of water rights, sufficient service quality, the availability of
reserve funds, the existence of an investment plan, pricing schedules, and financial statements, which
must be approved by the SAPR (Donoso, 2018). The new law also increases the accountability of
CWO operators, now giving the government the ability to ensure operators take the necessary steps
to conduct proper maintenance and maintain quality. Thus, both CWOs and operators have greater liab-
ility now, implying a critical need for training and a limited window during the 3-year implementation
for the government to carry out the training.
5.3. Finances
Finances are of critical importance in rural water systems. Two finance-related factors placed in
the top 10 factors: adequate tariffs (ranked 8th) and CWO finances, specifically the management and
administration of resources to finance the operation and the maintenance and eventual replacement of
water systems (ranked 5th). In rural water systems, adequate tariffs to cover the costs of management
and repairs are rare in most developing contexts (Harvey, 2007). In Chile, Fuster et al. (2016) found
that only 29% of APRs stated they were able to cover administration, equipment replacement, and
system expansion. This issue is pronounced for water systems with fewer connections, serving smaller
populations. For example, Navarro et al. (2007) find, in 2007, 63% of APRs that served under 250
connections had limited ability to generate even sufficient revenue to recover ongoing costs pertaining
to operating systems.
Rate increases present political dilemmas for whatever organization is running the system. For
community water committees, increasing tariffs within the community implies pressing friends and
neighbours for higher contributions (Fuster et al., 2016). Regarding this pressure, one expert commen-
ted, ‘In the rural sector of Chile, there is great distrust among neighbors… In that sense the state is
fundamental’. Yet, when decision-making authority to set or increase tariffs includes elected leaders
or political figures, such mayors or public service employees, tariffs are still likely to be set ‘below a
financially sustainable level’ out of political pressure to avoid alienating supporters (Krause, 2009).
In some Chilean cases, municipal governments manage rural water systems. In these instances, tariffs
can represent fungible accounts for political actors. Given the poor political visibility of investing in
the maintenance of rural water systems, political actors have incentives to repurpose tariff-based
income to public goods with more politically visible outcomes that can aid in elections (Mani &
Mukand, 2007). However, the new law has intervened and now only allows municipal management
as an exception and further requires that municipalities create formal cooperatives, creating barriers
for mayors to access funds from water tariffs.
The new law will partially address inadequate tariffs, but some argue that is does not go far enough.
The law creates a pathway for the increase of tariffs to address those that are below the costs of oper-
ation. This increase is scheduled to occur gradually, mediating the impact on users yet helping to
achieve more sustainable systems in the long run and removing the burden of initiating rate increases
from CWOs. Yet, some argue that the increase to merely address sufficient recuperation of operation
costs is still too low to address needs for replacement (Donoso, 2018). Others argue that relying on tar-
iffs to create long-term sustainability is misguided. As one expert in our study phrased it, ‘waiting for
the community members to replace or pay back for the system installation is unrealistic’. While the
increase through tariffs may be insufficient, the law does, at least, create a mandate for the federal
government to maintain ongoing financial investments in rural water systems.
Our experts further identified financial audits as an important factor for rural water sustainability.
While audits ranked only 16 in our results, having timely accounting audits to correct financial errors
provides financial accountability for CWOs. Fuster et al. (2016) found that while most CWOs were
providing balance sheets and financial information to their assemblies, many presented outdated infor-
mation and 56.7% of CWOs relied on technical units to conduct audits. The new law creates more
regulation and requirements for financial reporting and accounting, upping the standards for CWOs
of all sizes. For example, CWOs will be obliged to submit a financial plan, including detailed infor-
mation about tariff income and costs as well as plans to address future needs in the system. The law
further aims to create more uniformity in billing and oversight by the SAPR. Under Article 40 Letter
F, CWOs must issue bills and invoices and keep accounts in accordance with Chilean tax regulations,
and large and medium operators must prepare balances annually and share them with the SAPR.
5.4. Governance structure
The governance structure is also a theme in our results. For example, support networks and the
regulatory framework received high ratings. This aligns with the water sector literature that emphasizes
the importance of formal and informally structured post-construction support systems that includes a
robust and consistent network of highly skilled operators and personnel to help committees keep
their water systems running (Whittington et al., 2009). As one expert indicated, ‘A good support
network can help the self-sustainability of services’, where another expanded upon this logic, stating:
‘The establishment of work networks between organizations of APR and other organisms, both public
and private, fills technical gaps and gaps of formal support. Most committee members have been
in their position long enough to know how it all works but considering their educational level…
external support is necessary to improve efficiency, quality of service, and other aspects of manage-
ment such as the effective use of technology.’
The entities involved in the support network and the authority to enforce the regulatory framework,
however, garner lower scores and represent areas of disagreement in Chile. National government support
only scores a 4, ranking 19. Municipal government ranks strikingly low at 29, which contrasts to many
other contexts with responsibility decentralized to local government levels. Article 1 of the new law
establishes that local governments only have a role in exceptional cases. They can operate water systems
only with authorization for extraordinary situations, such as localities, where dispersed populations and
rugged geographies make it impossible to establish a water committee. In these cases, the municipality
must comply with all the requirements of the law and operate under a framework of its own regulation,
beyond the interest of the political authority in office.
The support from NGOs also received a low ranking. Many experts commented on their importance,
arguing that they can ‘supply support to [offset] the shortcomings of the state’, ‘provide more impetus to
[rural] systems’, and ‘supplement the limited capacity of the state’. Yet, some of these same experts
acknowledge that it is difficult to ensure the continuity of NGO support, limiting their efficacy as impor-
tant actors. One expert commented, ‘an NGO will not be more relevant than the government entities that
take charge of the APR issue. There is legislation, and an NGO will not work better than the DGA or
municipality because there are deadlines and stages that must be passed when an APR system is built,
maintained or extended’.
Other critical actors in the governance of rural water systems generally are the community members
and users themselves. These, too, rank low in our results. Community participation, specifically in ‘com-
munity-wide meetings, CWO member elections, or any other type of communal activity influencing
water service management’, ranked 20. The training and education of users ranked at 27. Contradicto-
rily, user participation has been elevated to an SDG target, encouraging countries to ‘support and
strengthen the participation of local communities in improving water and sanitation management’.
Overall, the actors ranked the highest in governance issues are the CWOs, discussed above, whose
role is augmented by the new law, as well as the private service providers, an area of debate in Chile
with the changes in the new law. Although water service providers, as in the formal technical engineer-
ing consultancies that help CWOs operate and maintain water systems, ranked third in our results, their
relevance has been substantially changed with the new law, representing an area of contention. Before
the new law, water service providers had a more pivotal role in the administration of water systems, in
training of the CWOs and in providing technical support. In the new law under Article 73 Letter F,
private consulting companies can be contracted to conduct studies, provide designs, and carry out
infrastructure projects, but they must be registered through the MOP and hired through a public bidding
process. Thus, these actors are not disappearing, but their roles are shifting considerably. Some disagree
with this change, arguing that CWOs rely on these secondary entities and have been largely satisfied
with their services (Fuster et al., 2016; Donoso, 2018). Yet, many smaller CWOs have limited capacity
to pay for the support of these water service providers. This ties into the debate about how capable
CWOs will be in assuming more complex roles in the provision of both water and sanitation services
and also represents a step away from relying on private actors in rural systems, a significant departure
for a country known as the textbook case of privatized water institutions. This disagreement, along with
the new presidency in Chile that is more supportive of private approaches to service provision, creates
a significant amount of pressure for the DOH and SAPR to successfully implement the law in the brief
3-year window slated for the transition.
5.5. Non-consensus issues
In our study, three items failed to achieve consensus, meaning that experts could not come to an
agreement about how important each of these factors is for sustainable water systems: water quality,
a service functionality database, and the technical capacity of CWOs. The database factor received
widely differing opinion due to the administrative demand it would impart. One expert indicated that
‘information is key to making good decisions’, while another mentioned that ‘today there are greater
urgencies’. Another expert failed to see the value of a database, commenting ‘I do not consider it of
relevant importance that a database with easy access improves the delivery of drinking water, which
is based on a system of water collection, chlorination, and distribution’. The disagreement around the
importance of monitoring and evaluation is inconsistent with water sector literature that argues monitor-
ing is critical to ensure water services are properly delivered to users. One reason for the disagreement
may be rooted in the underlying opinions about who ultimately has responsibility for poor performance.
For those that favour more privatized approaches with a limited role for central or local government, the
collection of data seems less consequential relative to direct investment in systems. For those that see an
important role for the state in ensuring citizens have access to well-managed water systems, information
on functionality is instrumental in creating upward accountability mechanisms to hold operators and
committees responsible.
The importance of water quality also divided our expert participants. According to one expert who
ranked water quality as the most important, ‘One of the greatest deficiencies in the supply of rural drink-
ing water is the lack of control over the quality of water supplied. The consequences for the health of the
consumers remains masked especially when dealing with pollutants with chronic effects’. Another
argued ‘Water quality controls are carried out with low frequency, and if they do not meet a parameter,
the appropriate measures are not taken in time’. Others did not see water quality as an issue, stating that
it ‘depends on the geographical area’ and ‘the quality of the water itself is not a preponderant factor that
prevents water supply, in fact, water can be supplied without any regulation given that water purification
systems must comply with the regulations’. Again, the lack of consensus appears to be influenced by
whether one agrees that the central government must play a stronger role in the enforcement of the
regulations.
Prior to the new law, the standards of water quality were established in Chilean Regulation No. 404,
which articulates the obligation to: (1) measure chlorine in the network at three points every day and
record results; (2) conduct at least two monthly bacteriological examinations for larger water systems;
and (3) conduct tests of physical chemistry at least once a year. The Health Authority oversees auditing.
These rules, however, now have more bite given the addition of Article 89 of the new law, which estab-
lishes sanctions and fines for non-compliance. The new law also stipulates that water quality samples
must be sent to duly certified laboratories and that each operator must have the results available in
their offices so any authority can review them.
6. Conclusion
This research presents findings of a Delphi study of rural water service experts in Chile around the
drivers of sustainable water services. Our work reveals incoherent views about the roles of water scar-
city, water rights, climate change, and agricultural use, such that experts are primarily concerned about
water availability, but the role of climate change in shaping availability is less concerning. We also find
experts placed a stronger emphasis on CWOs and private water service providers than government enti-
ties, which points to the possible resistance to the implementation of the new law that increases the role
of the central government and increases the responsibility of CWOs, despite rural water experts’ beliefs
that they lack the necessary technical capacity.
Our review of the Law No. 20.998 in light of these findings suggests some areas of concern in the
coming years. First, despite the impetus in the law to increase tariffs and address insufficient savings, the
ability to save for full infrastructure replacement is limited. More gravely, while water availability is
the top concern in our study, the new law does not reshape the ability of government or community
stakeholders to compel more efficient behaviour or safeguard water supply in conditions of drought.
However, the law does create more information and accountability mechanisms in order to identify,
track, and address problematic variation in services.
While our Delphi study presents interesting insights as to the perceptions of rural water experts in
Chile, we do not interpret these findings to be representative of all water experts in Chile. Given the
constrained number of observations and limitations in broader representation from all regions of the
country or from a wider array of experience including more water board members, we treat our data as
an opening for dialogue about the mechanisms to address the remaining gaps for Chile to achieve the
SDGs in rural water services. Further research to trace the implementation of Law No. 20.998 and
identify the conditions under which CWOs are more likely to be in line with the new law will help
to provide insights for countries that, like Chile, want to address the inequities of quality and challenges
of sustainability in rural water services.
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